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ABSTRACT
There are situations in which dispersed creditors (e.g., public creditors) have more difficulties and
higher costs when collecting their claims in financial distress than concentrated creditors (e.g., banks).
Under this assumption, our model predicts that measures of debt concentration relate [a] positively to
creditors’ chosen aggregate debt collection expenditures; [b] positively to management’s chosen
expenditures to avoid paying; [c] positively to total net litigation costs/waste in financial distress; and [d]
positively to accomplished claim recovery by creditors (to which we present some preliminary favorable
empirical evidence). Under additional assumptions, measures of debt concentration relate [e] positively
to intrinsic firm quality; [f] positively to creditor monitoring and negatively to managerial waste; [g]
positively to optimal continuation/discontinuation choices; [h] negatively to issuing marketing expenses.
In a signaling model, when concentration alone is not a sufficient signal, firms choose the ultimately
concentrated debt (i.e., a house bank) and have to pay a high interest.
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Coordination failure among multiple claimants, be they creditors or owners, is a
subject well-studied in the academic literature. Such coordination failures can lead
to takeover failures (Grossman and Hart (1980)) or bank-runs (Diamond and Dybvig
(1983), Obstfeld (1996); Morris and Shin (1998); Morris and Shin (1999)), or generally
reduce the probability of successful renegotiation to a proposed reorganization plan
when renegotiation requires simultaneous assent by many claimants (Preece and
Mullineaux (1996); Hege (1997); Bergloef, Roland, and von Thadden (2000)). In many
of these models, the coordination failures aid the dispersed claimants. In a sense,
claimants cooperation has to be purchased with an oﬀer that is attractive enough
for each and every claimant to choose to collaborate. Thus, coordination failure
can suggest that dispersed creditors or owners can receive higher settlements than
their hypothetically more concentrated but otherwise identical counterparts.
Zingales (1995) uses this insight to show that an entrepreneur may prefer to sell
a ﬁrm to dispersed owners in an IPO, who in turn can later obtain a higher price
for the shares from a potential acquiror than this entrepreneur could have obtained
by herself.1 In Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), the paper most interested in the
optimal concentration of creditors and thus most similar in goals to our own paper,
coordination failure is used to explicitly derive an optimal number of creditors: in
ﬁnancial distress, two creditors can extract more surplus than one creditor. This
can deter inappropriate (strategic) default by management. However, coordination
problems can also make two creditors less likely to facilitate corporate continuation
when it is optimal. The optimal number of creditors is thus a coordination tradeoﬀ
designed to approximate optimal termination/continuation.2
Yet, it is possible to draw a diﬀerent conclusion from the fact that dispersed
creditors cannot easily coordinate. Dispersed creditors are ﬁrst and foremost un-
1Of course, it could be that being public raises the probability that this ﬁrm will appear on the
radar screen of potential acquirors.
2Rajan (1992), Repullo and Suarez (1998), and others consider the tradeoﬀ between a concen-
trated creditor’s ability to collect information and decide intelligently, and his worse ability to
negotiate a better settlement due to lower concentration.
1able to be proactive. Thus, even though they are at an advantage when positive
assent to a relief plan is required from every creditor, they are at a disadvantage
when active opposition to management’s relief plan is required. In this case, mutual
free-riding incentives weakens the overall outcome for dispersed claimants. A good
example of how dispersion can facilitate bondholder expropriation are Gertner and
Scharfstein (1991) and Bernardo and Talley (1996), in which management can use
exchange oﬀers to expropriate wealth from uncoordinated creditors.
OurpaperbeginswithamotivatingpilotstudyfromtheNewYorkStatebankruptcy
court. In a sample of 63 bankruptcies, and adjusting for ﬁrm size, secured creditor
concentration helps secured creditors, and unsecured creditor concentration hurts
secured creditors in avoiding APR violations in favor of unsecured creditors.
Our model assumes that creditors must pro-actively seek to enforce their claims.
Our model is based on a conﬂict game, in which more proactive claimants can
achieve better outcomes for themselves. Conﬂict theory can be viewed as a reduced-
form method of modeling negotiations, which sidesteps the usually complex, often
asymmetric information games which underlie formal models of bargaining derived
from ﬁrst principles (e.g., Rubinstein (1982)). In exchange for a certain ad-hocness
in the speciﬁcation of how legal eﬀort aids outcomes, conﬂict models sometimes
oﬀer a more realistic description of empirical bargaining outcomes. Their reduced
form of modeling can provide interesting and relatively easily empirically testable
predictions. Conﬂict theory is by now an accepted mainstream method of modeling
(e.g., Hirshleifer (1978), Hirshleifer (1989), Hirshleifer (1991), Welch (1997), Rajan
and Zingales (1998), Bernardo, Talley, and Welch (2000) and many others).
In our model, multiple creditors have to negotiate with the entrepreneur in case
of ﬁnancial distress. Our paper uses “management,” “equity”, and “entrepreneur”
interchangeably. Collection costs can stem from the costs of ﬁling a claim, following
up through the bankruptcy process, investigating the ﬁrm’s true resources, commu-
nicating and negotiating with and pressuring management, hiring lawyers, bringing
motions to the court, etc. Management can establish procedures which make it dif-
ﬁcult for its creditors to prove and recover their claims, or hire lawyers to outright
2oppose APR (absolute priority rule). Indeed, a casual perusal of bankruptcy records
shows that it is not diﬃcult to ﬁnd examples of creditors who did not ﬁnd it in their
interest to go through the legal hoops necessary even to ﬁle, much less to reclaim
relatively modest claims in Chapter 11.3 Further, civil liability claims are commonly
dismissed by the bankruptcy court altogether.
Such APR violations are consistent with our model, in which a larger number of
creditors suﬀers from more mutual free-riding, which in turn compromises their
ability to collect on their claims. De facto, our model argues that, given a ﬁxed
level of debt, a distressed ﬁrm with a million uncoordinated small creditors is less
likely to be forced to pay its obligations than a ﬁrm with one creditor or a ﬁrm
with creditors that have a coordinating organ (e.g., a trustee for ﬁnancial bonds).
Although we are thinking of idiosyncratic, small credit (such as small trade credit
[Biais and Gollier (1997), Petersen and Rajan (1997)]) as a good application for our
model, our model can also apply to public debt which is not fully coordinated or
even civil legal claims brought by product customers and other stakeholders.
The diﬀerences in collection ability allow us to derive an optimal concentration
of creditors. An entrepreneur who chooses a large number of creditors ex-ante
assures herself of better bargaining ability against creditors in case of ﬁnancial
distress ex-post. Yet, in equilibrium, this costs the entrepreneur a higher interest
rate when raising the debt ex-ante.4 In contrast, an entrepreneur who chooses a
single creditor ex-ante will be forced to extensively (and expensively) negotiate with
this creditor in case of ﬁnancial distress, and this creditor will likely be relatively
more successful in enforcing her claim. Yet, in equilibrium, such an entrepreneur
will also enjoy a lower interest rate when raising the debt ex-ante.
In our model, the ex-ante number of creditors determines both the ex-post distri-
bution of cash ﬂows in distress and the socially ineﬃcient costs of claim collection.
3An alternative to the conﬂict game would be to model collection costs of creditors directly, and
show that some eﬀort by the ﬁrm would lead such creditors to not incur the costs of attempting
recovery. The implications of such a model are the same as those that we stress in our own paper.
4In the case of customers who can recognize their lower ability to ﬁle civil suit in case the
product turns out to be defective, in lower product prices for an equally good product.
3The model shows that measures of debt dispersion (the number of creditors) corre-
lates positively with the entrepreneur’s retention of the ﬁrm in bankruptcy (fewer
creditors ) worse outcome for management in ﬁnancial distress), and negatively
with the in-equilibrium claims collection costs (fewer creditors ) more collection
eﬀorts, costs, and waste).
Inoursimplestframework, theonlydeadweightcostofcreditisthein-equilibrium
spending on conﬂict. Thus, by itself, this “number of creditors” tradeoﬀ in ﬁnancial
distress—in which more creditors in ﬁnancial distress have lesser ability to wrestle
the ﬁrm from management—has a ﬁrst-best outcome, in which the number of cred-
itors is inﬁnitely large. No collection costs would be incurred in ﬁnancial distress,
and perfectly dispersed creditors receive proper ex-ante compensation (higher in-
terest rates) for their perfect ex-post expropriation.
To solve an “optimal capital structure” model in which at least some ﬁrms ﬁnd it
in their interest to choose a small number of creditors, there must be an oﬀsetting
advantage to having fewer creditors. There are at least four applicable mechanisms
that can be invoked:
Signaling Firms may know whether they are of high-quality or low-quality. A ﬁrm
that chooses fewer creditors signals its higher conﬁdence that it will not go
bankrupt and incur ex-post waste.
Fewer Creditors ) Higher Inferred Firm Quality
Agency Management may be better kept in check by fewer creditors. Such creditors
have an incentive to invest more in monitoring activity even if the ﬁrm is not
in distress.
Fewer Creditors ) Better Creditor Monitoring
4Optimal Continuation/Termination Fewer coordinated creditors can respond bet-
tertomakeanintelligentdecisionofwhetheraﬁrmindistressshouldcontinue
to operate.
Fewer Creditors ) Better Termination Choices
This is the mechanism in Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) (which however oﬀers
diametrically opposite empirical implications to our own paper with respect to
the number of creditors). In a sense, this mechanism can be considered sim-
ilar to value-enhancing agency monitoring, but after the ﬁrm enters ﬁnancial
distress.
Simple Transaction Costs It may be more expensive to market debt claims to mul-
tiple creditors than it is to market them to just a few creditors.
Fewer Creditors ) Lower Marketing Costs
Indeed, when our model is applied to product market liabilities/claims, it may
be exceedingly expensive for the ﬁrm to alter its market from few product
purchasers (imposing high distress costs) to just a few purchasers (with lower
distress costs).
Naturally, these factors may be simultaneously at work. For example, a single
ﬁrm may balance the costs of fewer creditors (i.e., incurring in-equilibrium conﬂict
waste) against a better inference about its quality drawn by the market, against
better eﬃcient monitoring of managerial choices, and against a desire to ex-ante
commit to sometimes (and optimally) hand the ﬁrm to creditors in ﬁnancial distress.
The model is kept deliberately simple, if only to avoid deceiving the reader into
believing that more algebraic generality could purchase signiﬁcant more empirical
realism. Corporate ﬁnance models are often highly stylized and serve primarily
to show that the economic intuition is internally consistent—and our model is no
exception. Real life corporate decisions are complex and doubtlessly determined
by many unmodeled factors. In particular, the reader should recognize that there
5can also be many situations in which dispersed creditors have more power, not
less power, e.g. as in Bolton and Scharfstein (1996). In the end, it will be up to
the empirical evidence to measure whether and when dispersion weakens creditors
and when it strengthens creditors. Fortunately, creditor concentration is relatively
easy to measure empirically, which should permit empiricists to relatively easily
distinguish between the predictions of these models.
At times, we identify the most concentrated debt, i.e., a single creditor, as a
(house) bank. Although banks doubtlessly perform other functions, they do tend to
assume debt in a more concentrated fashion than public creditors. Thus, although
simplistic , it is quite likely that lack of dispersion is a good characterization of
one of the diﬀerences between public creditors and banks. In the signaling version
of our paper, when concentration (the most eﬃcient signal) is exhausted, creditors
resort to paying excess rents to banks to assure separation. Thus, this version of
our model predicts that bank debt carries higher expected (not promised!) yields
higher than public debt.
Welch (1997) is closest to our paper, at least in its approach and technology. It
models the conﬂict between existing bank debt and public debt and comes to the
conclusion that if a company has already issued both kinds of debt, and it now
must decide which to make senior, it is the bankdebt which should be the senior
security. In Welch (1997), there is neither a role for equity, nor a role for multiple
creditors withequal ﬁghting ability, norexplicit free-riding amongcreditors ofequal
seniority, nor an endogenous determination of the number of creditors or type of
credit or excess interest rate. Indeed, Welch (1997) does not even consider the
entrepreneur’s choice between bank debt and public debt.
We shall now proceed as follows: Section II describes our pilot study, in which
we ﬁnd that creditor concentration helped creditors in a particular situation. Sec-
tion III describes the conﬂict game played between N creditors and management
in ﬁnancial distress. This section solves the dynamic optimization from the per-
spective of management. The result of this section is that there is a monotonically
positive relation between debt concentration and in-equilibrium waste. Section IV
6grafts onto this base model a signaling case in which higher-quality managers signal
their conﬁdence by choosing fewer creditors. We also show that after concentra-
tion signaling is exhausted (i.e., the ﬁrm chooses only 1 creditor, a “house” bank),
entrepreneurs must resort to yield signaling. Section V outlines variant models
(agency, continuation, marketing) that similarly lead to an interior optimal creditor
concentration. Section VI discusses our empirical implications, contrasts them with
Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), and describes some evidence that is relevant to our
argument. Section VII concludes brieﬂy.
II A Pilot Study: Does Concentration or Dispersion Aid
Recovery?
In Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), concentration hurts creditors. Because our model
will be consistent with the opposite implication (that concentration helps creditors),
we decided to conduct a pilot study.
We collected bankruptcy cases from the Southern District of New York (Manhat-
tan, Poughkeepsie, and White Plains). The full text is available through the Public
Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER), an electronic public access service that
allows users to obtain case and docket information. We identiﬁed all the closed
Chapter 11 cases in the district as of August 2001, for which data on ﬁrm charac-
teristics, creditors’ claims, and Chapter 11 resolution was available. We hand-coded
this information. Our data sample diﬀers from earlier studies, because we include
smaller and private bankruptcies.
We found 63 cases with data on both APR violations and the number of secured
and unsecured creditors. Loans with both secured and unsecured components are
separated and their components are assigned into the correct categories. The ear-
liest case in our sample was ﬁled in July 1995, the most recent in July 2000. The
average ﬁrm size is $17.372 million, and the average value of liabilities is $34.488
million. In particular, we obtained information on the number of secured and un-
7secured creditors, and on APR violations, if any. In our average ﬁrm, there are 3.5
secured creditors, and 174 unsecured creditors. APR is violated 3 times against
creditors in favor of equityholders, and 9 times against secured creditors in favor
of unsecured creditors.
Unsecured creditors are consolidated into one creditor committee. Secured cred-
itors have to ﬁnd their own mechanisms to coordinate their eﬀorts. Deﬁne the “se-
cured creditors outcome” as what was granted to secured creditors minus the value
of the secured claim or total assets (whichever is smaller), divided by the size of the
secured claim. (Although quoting outcome in percent already oﬀers some size ad-
justment, our regressions also control for total assets.) A White heteroskedasticity-
adjusted regression among our 63 observations yields
Secured Creditors Outcome = 0.11 –0.01 NS + 0.39 NU=1000 + 
1 TA + 
2 TA2 
(p-value): (0.012) (0.025) (0.010) (not signiﬁcant)
Mean: 0.14 0.03 3.50 0.173
Stddev: (0.32) (0.19) (9.91) (0.483)
with an adjusted R2 of 6.0%.5 The negative coeﬃcient on NS indicates that se-
cured creditors receive a worse outcome the higher the number of secure creditors.
The positive coeﬃcient on NU=1000 indicates that the higher the number of un-
secured creditors (divided by 1,000), the better the outcome to secured creditors.
However, unsecured creditors’s legal expenses are subsidized by the ﬁrm, and they
have a coordinating committee, indicating caution in interpreting the number of
creditors as a proxy for dischord. Nevertheless, the two relationships indicate to us
that concentration is a positive factor in the competition between secured and un-
secured creditors. Put diﬀerently, creditor dispersion is not helpful. (Total assets
[TA] and total assets squared [TA2] are included as control variables, but are not
statistically signiﬁcant.) A similar regression to explain the outcome for unsecured
5We also tried a non-linear transformation, in which we estimated   0:5 on a 1=1  N
speciﬁcation with 0.00 statistical signiﬁcance. (The test of whether concentration is a positive or
negative inﬂuence is now that  > 0.) Although the result is more signiﬁcant and again in favor of
our theory, because the results are more diﬃcult to explain, we report the simple linear regression
instead.
8creditors shows no signiﬁcant variables.6
We also estimated a logit regression for violation of APR from secured creditors
in favor of unsecured creditors. Again, concentration indicates a stronger negoti-
ation ability. In our data set, which also included many smaller non-public ﬁrms
(many of which were probably simply liquidated), there were only three APR viola-
tions in favor of equity. Thus, we cannot reliably report how creditor concentration
inﬂuenced negotiating ability relative to equity. Finally, we wish to reemphasize
that evidence does not reject Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) in other situations.
III The Cost of A Given Number of Creditors
We begin with a simple “creditor concentration” model. Our primary intent is to de-
rive the in-equilibrium costs/waste of claims collection as a function of the number
of creditors.
A The Assumptions
Insert Table 1 here
[Table of Symbols]
Table 1 lists the symbols used in our paper. In stage 1 of the game, the entre-
preneur owns in-place assets worth VOld. To adopt a project that provides 0 with
probability  and VNew with probability 1 , the entrepreneur must raise external
ﬁnancing I () I > VOld). We also assume that the project is intrinsically worthwhile,
i.e., 1   VNew > I. This ﬁnancing can be in the form of debt raised from an
(endogenously determined) number of creditors, N.7
6Unsecured creditors are coordinated through a committee, and thus may act more like a single
creditor. In addition, their legal activities are subsidized by the court, allowing them to mount an
eﬀective campaign more easily.
7The model in this section ﬁnds a ﬁrst-best solution. Thus, we could permit the ﬁrm to raise
capital via equity, and it would not improve the ﬁrm’s fate. When we introduce beneﬁts to a limited
number of creditors in the next section, the ﬁrm voluntarily avoids the ﬁrst-best solution, and thus
would avoid raising equity, too. Thus, omitting raising equity is without loss of generality.
9If the project later were to fail, the ﬁrm still owns its project in place, VOld. Al-
though creditors “should” receive what the absolute priority rule (APR) promises
them, collection costs (such as courts, lawyers, and “legal maneuvers”) will allow
management to reduce creditors’ claims in ﬁnancial distress by up to X. The fact
that ﬁnancial distress is not free or ex-ante completely contracted away (Schwartz
and Watson (2000)), and that part of the function of lawyers is to inﬂuence courts
and obtain rents is reasonably realistic (Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989), Glaeser and
Shleifer (2001)). However, the speciﬁc details of conﬂict are extremely complex,
and thus our paper relies on a ﬂexible, parameterized “black box.”8 To “ﬁght” for X,
both creditors and management can devote eﬀort. The exact allocation of X to man-
agement (equity) is determined by a contest success function. For example, equity
may grab fraction e of the contested amount X if equity spends Le on debt collec-
tion avoidance/inﬂuence-seeking and debt spends Ld on debt collection/inﬂuence-










1  Ld=Le  Ld=Le : (1)
 0 is a parameter which measures the relative eﬀect of disproportionate spend-
ing, e is a mnemonic for equity, d for debt, and x  1=1  x. Our context
success function is a ratio function, as discussed in Hirshleifer (1989). The fraction
not allocated to equity, d  1   e, goes to the creditors:










1  Le=Ld  Le=Ld : (2)
When Le=Ld  1, the absolute priority rule prevails. When Le=Ld < 1, APR
is violated in favor of equity.  can be considered as a probability of holding onto
APR, or as a fraction of the disputed amount X that is allotted to debt in ﬁnancial
distress, or both. The combination of a parametrized X with a contest success
8Similar simplifying functional forms about underlying values and monitoring, as well as similar
assumptions about an inability to write complete contracts are often made in the monitoring
literature.
10function can cover a wide range of possible allocation scenarios.
Because legal eﬀort goes beyond pure litigation, and extends to such out-of-court
activities as settlement negotiations and “fact ﬁnding,” we adopt the term “lobby-
ing” instead of “litigating” in this paper. Both equity and creditors are assumed to
pay for their own lobbying expenses.9 One unit of lobbying (collection) costs cd for
creditors, ce for equity. As is the law, creditors in the same class must be treated
equally.10 Neither management nor creditors can commit not to act opportunis-
tically in case of ﬁnancial distress. Capital markets are perfectly competitive, the
ﬁrm is acting strategically. All participants are risk-neutral optimizers, and there is
no asymmetric information in the ﬁnancial distress game. (Any asymmetric infor-
mation is assumed to be fully captured by the known contest success function. We
will introduce a signaling component later in the paper.)
B The Financial Distress Game
B.1 The Creditors’ Problems
First consider the problem of a single among N creditor if the ﬁrm enters ﬁnancial
distress. Under full APR, he receives VOld=N, because VNew  0 and this creditor has
ﬁrst claim to the remaining ﬁrm’s assets, which are assumed to be insuﬃcient to
cover the required investment. Under maximum violation, he receives VOld=N X=N.
He beneﬁts from both his own lobbying, denoted ld, and the lobbying of other
9The insights of this paper are largely unaﬀected if the ﬁrm reimburses creditors and man-
agement for their legal costs (as in Chapter 11). This arrangement defacto subsidizes the legal
eﬀorts of lower-priority claimants from higher-quality claimants. However, the algebra becomes
substantially more complex. See also Welch (1997).
10If one were to allow creditors to compete with one another to collect from a limited amount
of funds, and management would pay oﬀ the loudest claimants in the same class but leave other
claimants dry, free-riding of creditors on one another would be mitigated. However, there would
then be a conﬂict game among creditors, and perhaps even a “run” (Diamond and Dybvig (1983))
on the ﬁrm’s assets. We focus on our simpler model only.




 d is the fraction of X accruing
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d  lo2  cd : (4)
Note that all creditors are equal. Thus, a minimal equilibrium condition is that
l?
o  N   1l
?
d and aggregate creditor collection eﬀort is L
?
d  N  l
?
d.
B.2 The Management’s Problem
Unlike creditors, management does not suﬀer from a free-riding problem. Under
APR, management receives 0. The entrepreneur maximizes with respect to Le in
ﬁnancial distress (i.e., VOld   I  1   VNew are sunk costs, and we are only investi-











 X   ceLe (5)
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d  N  l
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Thus, if there is one creditor and the ﬁghting costs are equal, both debt and equity
will ﬁght equally hard for X. However, if there are two creditors, management will
spend twice as much as debt on lobbying eﬀort in equilibrium. This is due to the
free-riding among creditors in spending money on claims collection.
Equation 8 further allows us to replace the endogenous choice variables in the










d  K. (If we assume that creditors are not intrinsically better at ﬁghting
















 K : (10)
where K is the allocation fraction favoring of creditors. (A higher K means a
lower , which makes creditors happier.)
We shall now return from arbitrary ratio functions back to the speciﬁc ratio
function in eq. 1. Substituting eq. 10 back into the ﬁrst-order conditions eqs. 6

















 X : (12)











 X : (13)
Asymptotically, the waste in this conﬂict game is smaller when there are signiﬁ-
cant asymmetries in strength between the debt and equity contestants, i.e., when
K (which itself embeds N!) and  are large. Here, creditors are weakest when their
number is high. Thus, a very large number of creditors can drive in-equilibrium con-
ﬂict costs to zero. This also implies that it is suﬃcient if cd is not much less than
ce, i.e., as long as creditors are not intrinsically better ﬁghting for the potentially
reallocable component X than management and thus K  1, waste is lower when
N increases above 1.11 This enhances asymmetry. Although the exact derivative of
waste with respect to N depends on the ratio between cd and ce (see subsection C),
asymptotically, as N ! 1, waste W?N ! 0.
As in all models of competitive credit provision, the entrepreneur internalizes
these ex-post waste costs in equilibrium. Thus, without any other considerations
which couldinduce theentrepreneur into restrictingthe number ofcreditors, having
as many creditors as possible maximizes the entrepreneur’s ﬁrm value.12
11Remember that K  N cd=ce. Not too surprisingly, the comparative statics discussed below
can reverse locally if cd << ce, i.e., if creditors were far more eﬃcient at producing a unit of legal
inﬂuence than management. Doubling the number of creditors in such situations can drive cd N
close to ce.
12We are ignoring the side condition management that the entrepreneur may have to sell more
than 100% of the ﬁrm to raise the necessary credit.
14C The Ex-Ante Price of Debt
To obtain credit of I, which is assumed necessary to ﬁnance the project, an entre-
preneur has to oﬀer debt face value FV that satisﬁes
I   


?VOld  1   




 1     FV
? ; (14)
where ?  L?
e =L
?
d  1=1  K  1=1  Ncd=ce is the in-equilibrium frac-
tion of X that creditors expect to receive and L
?
d is given in eq. 12. The ﬁrst term
is the expected payoﬀ to creditors in bankruptcy, the second term is the promised
payoﬀ to creditors outside of bankruptcy. In bankruptcy, the claimants can recover
VOld, the assets in place (because the value of the new project VNew is worthless), net
of their in-equilibrium reduction due to managerial ex-post opportunism and net of
their own ﬁghting costs. We also assume that FV?  VOld  VNew, so that the ﬁrm is
able to pay oﬀ the debt in the non-bankrupt state.13
















Note that, given our formulation, if X is very large and ? ! 0, the term “creditor”
is almost a misnomer. In ﬁnancial distress, such creditors would not receive very
much at all. They would eﬀectively be more of a residual claimant than equity itself.
D The Ex-Ante Entrepreneur’s Problem
The Entrepreneur is maximizing equity’s value (E) today, i.e.
E   


?  0  1   




 1     VOld  VNew   FV
? (16)
13 It is suﬃcient if  < , where  is deﬁned by K   1 < 1.  is usually a high number, so
this constraint is rarely an issue.
15with respect to the number of creditors. A quick check shows that in ﬁnancial
distress, E  I  VOld   W?N; if the project is successful, E  I  VOld  VNew.
The ﬁrst-order condition of E with respect to N is a long algebraic expression,
but it is easier to derive the sign of the comparative statics from the insight that
entrepreneurs internalize all waste in a competitive capital market, i.e., from eq. 13
:
E
?  VOld   I  1     VNew     W
?N : (17)
























































These equations state that the entrepreneur is better oﬀ if when cd >> ce, X is
small, and N and  are large. There is no clear comparative static with respect to
the decisiveness parameter : for small values of K and , it can be negative. As
either K or  becomes large, the derivative of E? with respect to  is positive.
16IV Creditor Concentration and Financial Distress Con-
ﬂict In a Capital Structure Model: A Signaling Model
Almost all theories of capital structure center around the eﬀects of an increase in the
expected costs of bankruptcy (probability of and waste in) when the ﬁrm takes on
additionaldebt. Ourmodelisnoexception. Itmerelyidentiﬁesthedeadweightcosts
of bankruptcy as the waste of socially ineﬃcient claims collection, and it relates this
speciﬁc cost of debt to the number of creditors.
To obtain an equilibrium in which some ﬁrms are willing to incur these ﬁnancial
distress costs in equilibrium, there must also be some advantages to the otherwise
disadvantageous debt choice to a ﬁnite number of creditors. We now discuss four
diﬀerent mechanisms: signaling (in some detail) in this section; and agency, optimal
termination/continuation, and marketing costs in the following section.
A A Revised Model
In the prior model, there was no drawback to the use of multiple creditors. Cred-
itors were maximally expropriated in ﬁnancial distress, but compensated ex-ante
for being ex-post expropriated.
Now, consider the presence of two diﬀerent kinds of ﬁrms: good, high-quality
(G) ﬁrms with a lower probability of bankruptcy (G), and bad, low-quality (B) ﬁrms
with a higher probability of bankruptcy (B).
B Signaling With The Number of Creditors
Signaling works if there is a diﬀerentially higher cost for low-quality ﬁrms to send
the signal. To deter imitation, high-quality ﬁrms therefore want to minimize cor-
porate payoﬀs if they enter ﬁnancial distress. These payoﬀs are lower if [a] litiga-
tion waste upon ﬁnancial distress is higher and [b] entrepreneur’s relative (post-
17litigation) share of the ﬁrm is lower. Having fewer creditors accomplishes both
objectives. Thus, signaling through creditor concentration is a relatively eﬃcient
separation mechanism.
We have set up the problem intentionally so that the signaling equilibrium is easy
to construct. Because signaling equilibria are well understood, we shall be casual
on formal equilibrium deﬁnitions, and just focus on the pareto-dominant signaling
equilibrium. For the sake of brevity, we shall also treat integer constraints on the
number of creditors rather casually.
In a separating equilibrium, the low-quality entrepreneur prefers revelation to
imitation. Revelationprovidesthelow-qualityentrepreneurwithherfull-information
ﬁrst-best proceeds of
VOld   I  1   BVNew : (23)
To achieve this, the entrepreneur would oﬀer highly dispersed (public) debt. Imita-
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 1   B  VNew  VOld   FVG ; (24)
where the FVG indicates that an out-of-equilibrium imitating low-quality ﬁrm can re-
ceive the high-quality ﬁrms’ price of credit (based on the good ﬁrm’s distress prob-
ability G, not the imitator’s true distress probability B). FVG is given in eq. 15. A
reasonable signaling equilibrium emerges in which the diﬀerence in proﬁts between
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is just below zero. @GFI=@N is a complex expression (because K embeds N). How-
ever, we do know that larger numbers of creditors are preferred when there is no
signaling, and the low-quality ﬁrm’s outcome does not depend on N if it confesses




Thus, a potential low-quality imitator has less to gain from imitation when there
are fewer creditors. For the signaling equilibrium to have a solution in which the
low-quality ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between imitating and not imitating, the right part of
eq. 25 must be negative.
C Comparative Statics
For the most part, the comparative statics are messy, but straightforward. The task
is easy, because we have constructed the model so that the number of creditors
only matters in the cost of sending the signal (N), not in the beneﬁts of the signal.
The comparative statics are determined by the incentive compatibility constraint
to prevent low-quality ﬁrms’ imitation. Appealing again to our side condition that
cd  ce, the sign of the implicit diﬀerentiated @N?
=@ is the opposite to the sign











19Preexisting Firm Value VOld: If VOld is high relative to I, high-quality ﬁrms need to
sell little debt and prefer to simply wait instead. Thus, imitation is relatively










Thus, N? increases when ﬁrms have more assets in place (VOld).
New Opportunities Cost I: If VOld is high relative to I, high-quality ﬁrms need to
sell little debt and prefer to simply wait instead. Thus, imitation is relatively










N? decreases when ﬁrms have to raise more money to take the project (I).
Disputable Amount X: The signaling schedule requires a ﬁxed cost to potential
imitators. If X is large, the ﬁxed imitation prevention cost can be achieved
with more creditors. Formally, X appears only as a factor in the term that
must be negative so that GFI




























20Firm Bankruptcy Probabilities G and B: If good ﬁrms never go bankrupt, G 
0, good ﬁrms know they must never bear ex-post negotiations, so the lowest
number of creditors imposes the highest cost on bad-quality ﬁrms. Alterna-
tively, when G is close to B, bad ﬁrms have little incentive to imitate (there
is little to be gained), and thus N can be large.
Formally, if the diﬀerence between ﬁrm types tends to zero, we know that GFI
could not be positive (N here can be ﬁnite):













?  0, for B > G, it must be that the gains to imitation
decrease in the probability of bankruptcy for the good ﬁrm (@GFI=@G < 0),
and increase in the probability that the bad ﬁrm goes bankrupt (@GFI=@B > 0).
After all, GFI is a monotonic function of both B and G for 0  B < 1,







> 0 : (31)
Eﬀective Entrepreneurial Advantage K: If resistance is futile (too costly for cred-
itors), then high-quality ﬁrms ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to obtain enough creditor
resistance to induce the low-quality ﬁrm not to follow. Thus, to signal, a high-
quality ﬁrm needs to choose even fewer creditors when cd=ce and thus K is
large.
Formally, the partial derivative @GFI=@K is positive. First note that because































































































































X > 0 ; (33)
because B > G
h
1   B=1   G
i
 G=N1   B=1   G, and K  1.









< 0 : (34)
Fighting Decisiveness : The sign with respect to  is ambiguous, as it was in the
no-signaling comparative static eq. 22.
These comparative statics should be unsurprising to connoisseurs of signaling
models. They are determined by the self-punishing mechanisms necessary to deter
low-quality imitation.
D Signaling By Debt Pricing And Debtor Concentration
When separation by choice of creditors is insuﬃcient, entrepreneurs may have to
underprice their debt, i.e., pay a relatively high interest rate. Interestingly, this has
a direct implication: Even though the required yields on highly concentrated bank
debt can be lower than those on dispersed public debts (to allow for banks superior
ability to defend their APR), banks earn excess rents (positive expected returns) from
their loans made. This is not to purchase bank services, but to assure separation.14
14Necessarily, we would expect competitive banks to compete these rents away (e.g., through
higher ﬁxed costs).
22Proposition 1 When ﬁrms can use either yields or creditor concentration for signal-
ing, two choices emerge in equilibrium:
1. The ﬁrm oﬀers fairly priced debt to a creditor base, concentrated or unconcen-
trated.
2. The ﬁrm oﬀers good-deal debt to a single concentrated creditor (bank debt).
In particular, the ﬁrm will not oﬀer good-deal debt to public creditors.
The proof is in the appendix. The intuition is that signaling with creditor con-
centration is the more eﬃcient signal: it inﬂicts pain when the ﬁrm goes bankrupt,
which is more likely to happen to a low-quality ﬁrm. When the signal is exhausted,
i.e. N  1, which we interpret as bank debt, a high-quality ﬁrm then must pay
a higher price for credit to separate. High bank debt interest rates do not arise
from credit-rationing or poor quality or the purchase of monitoring services, but
instead from high-quality, high uncertainty, and the need to separate from other
ﬁrms! Naturally, in real life, banks probably both monitor and permit signaling.
E A Numerical Illustration of The Signaling Model
For easy checking, Table 1 contains some numerical values that help gathering intu-
ition. We use as parameters X  $80, I  $100, VOld  80, VNew  $250, cd  ce  $1,
  1:5, B  0:5, and G  0:4. Note that, under full APR violation (which happens
with probability 1   ?), creditors are fully expropriated by equityholders.
In the non-signaling case, suppose there is only one type of ﬁrms, that is   0:5.
The optimal solution is for the ﬁrm to set N  1 ) ?  0. The face value of
the debt equals FV  $200, and Ld  Le  0. Proﬁts to equityholders are E? 
X  1   VOld  VNew   FV  $105, which equals the full information value
VOld  1   VNew   I (after paying oﬀ creditors).
Suppose this was the bad ﬁrm (B  0:5), and there is a good ﬁrm in the market,
with G  0:4 now. Its full information value would be $130 (see Table 1). The high-
23quality ﬁrm prefers to have a lower number of creditors. Its optimal N? solving
eq. 25 is N?  2:26 (' 2). This is costly, because if the high-quality ﬁrm goes
bankrupt, Ld  $9:31, Le  $21:06, and ?  0:22. However, because the ﬁrm
borrows from a fewer number of creditors, FV  $160:76 (creditors know now
that they will recover more in the bankrupt state). Consequently, the high-quality
ﬁrm’s equity value is E?  $117:84. The diﬀerence between this amount, and the
full information value of the good ﬁrm, $12:15, is the signaling cost. Note that, by
imitating the good ﬁrm, the bad ﬁrm would be worth
B 1   
?X   ceLe  1   BVOld  VNew   FV
?  $105 ;
exactly its full information value. In equilibrium, there are no incentives for the
bad ﬁrm to imitate the good ﬁrm. There is no need for the good ﬁrm to signal with
the debt yield r, because we know, from Proposition 1, that signaling with creditor
concentration alone is preferred.
Suppose instead that the good ﬁrm is in fact very good, and G  0:2. Thus,
its full information value is $180. As in the previous example, the optimal N?
solves eq. (25), and N?  0:188. This is impossible, so the ﬁrm must set N?  1.
There would still be gains from imitation for the bad ﬁrm, because by imitating the
good ﬁrm with N?  1, the bad ﬁrm pays FV  $122:5, ?  0:5, Le  Ld  30,
and GFI  $3:75. The good ﬁrm needs to additionally increase the debt yield to
r?  6%. Now FV
?  $130, with ?  0:5, Le  Ld  30 (with one creditor and one
entrepreneur, the legal expenses for both are equal if their cost is also equal). The
higher face value restrain the bad ﬁrm from imitation, since imitation yields
0:5$40   $30  0:5$80  $250   $130  $5  $100  $105 ;
exactly the full information value of the bad ﬁrm. For the good ﬁrm, however,
separation yields
0:2$40   $30  0:7$80  $250   $130  $2  $140  $142 :
24This is still lower than its full information value $180. The cost of signalling has
therefore increased to $38.
Insert Figure 1 here
[In-Signaling-Equilibrium Regions]
Figure 1 shows the two regions for which it is optimal to signal with either N
only, or with N and the debt yield r. For B > 0:6, at least the bad ﬁrm’s (and
possibly also the good ﬁrm’s) project has a negative NPV, so a signaling equilibrium
makes no sense. The upward sloping curve solves G as a function of B in (25),
where N?  1. N? becomes larger as B and G become closer. When r? > 0, the
debt yield decreases as both probabilities of default become closer.
Insert Figure 1 here
[In-Signaling-Equilibrium Promised Yields]
Figure 2 plots the promised rate of return (
FV
I   1) to creditors of the good ﬁrm
for diﬀerent levels of creditor concentration. For any value of N to be optimal, we
let B  0:5, and allow G to vary. As N ! 1, the face value of the debt tends to
$200, and therefore the promised rate of return tends to $200=$100   1  100%.
In the ﬁgure, the expected yield r? would be zero for N? > 1. For N?  1, the yield
can range from 0% to 45%.
V Alternative Mechanisms
A An Agency Model Alternative
Itwouldbesimilarlyeasytoembedex-postﬁnanciallobbyingcostsintoanagency/monitoring
model instead of a signaling model. In such a model, although a single creditor can
ﬁght better and thus cause more waste in ﬁnancial distress than multiple creditors,
he would also be assumed to monitor management better. As before, the costs of
25fewer creditors is more waste in bankruptcy. The beneﬁts of fewer creditors would













where V is ﬁrm value, M is the amount and quality of monitoring, and N is the num-
ber of creditors. The in-equilibrium tradeoﬀ would be that fewer creditors would
monitor better (increasing ﬁrm value and/or reducing the probability of distress),
but also cost more in ﬁnancial distress.
Depending on the functional speciﬁcation of agency beneﬁts, an interior solution
could emerge in which ﬁrms more in need of monitoring would be more willing to
live with fewer creditors. The comparative statics are straightforward:
1. N? decreases (facilitating more monitoring) when the value to monitoring
(@V=@M) is high.
2. N? increases (facilitating less monitoring) when it is diﬃcult to inﬂuence the
aggregate monitoring by choosing the number of creditors (@M=@N).
As is typical, many of the comparative statics of signaling models are diﬀerent
from those of agency models—but with both theories relying on variables that are
diﬃcult to observe (or which by deﬁnition must be unobservable), it is often diﬃcult
to empirically distinguish between the two.
B An Optimal Continuation Alternative
In Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), the costs of more creditors is mutual free-riding
when it comes to the ex-ante eﬃciency of the ex-post optimal continuation choice
(terminate if termination is optimal; continue if continuation is optimal). The ﬁght-
ing tradeoﬀ considered in our paper could also be embedded in such a model. If a
single creditor were able to wrestle the ﬁrm from management in ﬁnancial distress,
26he could internalize the continuation choice. Thus, fewer creditors would mean
more claims collection waste, but better continuation choice. The comparative stat-
ics would depend on the creditors’ ability to internalize the continuation choice.
(Empirical evidence to the continuation/termination choice can be found in Kahl
(2001) and Andrade and Kaplan (1998).)
In contrast to Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), however, fewer creditors obtain
more, not fewer resources in ﬁnancial distress in our model. Consequently, the
tradeoﬀs are diﬀerent: creditors intrinsically prefer coalescing, management is am-
bivalent. In Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), creditors intrinsically prefer dispersing,
and management has to try to prevent this to preserve ﬁrm value.
C Marketing Costs
It requires little explanation to point out that ﬁnding multiple creditors may, under
some circumstances, require more eﬀort than ﬁnding a single creditor. Multiple
creditors may require more shoeleather and road shows than a single creditor or
bank. A single creditor may also ﬁnd it easier to conduct the normal due diligence
than many dispersed creditors. To raise the same amount of funding might thus
be costlier through multiple creditors. If this assumption about costs of ﬁnding
creditors is correct, the model predicts that entrepreneurs trade oﬀ the marketing
costs of more creditors against the waste costs of fewer creditors.
VI Implications
The intent of our approach is not to stress the monitoring, signaling, continuation
or transaction cost aspects. These have already been treated in other literature and
thus are probably familiar to the academic reader. Instead, our intent is to stress
the consequences of the assumption that spending money on lobbying/lawyers can
better one’s position in ﬁnancial distress.
27Insert Table 2 here
[Comparison With Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) Model of Creditor Concentration.]
The main intuition and empirical implication of our approach are summarized
in Table 2: Dispersed creditors are at a relative disadvantage in ﬁnancial distress.
Coordination and free-riding costs among creditors allow the ﬁrm to escape some of
their contractual obligations. Put succinctly, concentrated and/or coordinated cred-
itors spend more on lobbying and representation than dispersed creditors. Thus,
they receive a better settlement than unconcentrated debt would. To respond to
concentrated debt, management also spends more on lobbying in equilibrium. The
more creditors, the more management spends relative to the aggregate creditor le-
gal expenses, but the less management spends in absolute terms. Aggregate waste
is lower when creditors are dispersed.
Our model also predicts that there are incentives for creditors to concentrate
ex-post. Concentration enhances creditors’ bargaining power. It is true that this
implications can be generated within other contexts. For example, in Bolton and
Scharfstein (1996), it could be that creditors could choose to concentrate in order to
avoid ineﬃcient liquidation. But, under other parameters, this theory could suggest
that creditors could choose to diﬀuse in order to avoid ineﬃcient continuation. In
this sense, our own implication is more robust.
Holding the amount of debt constant, ﬁrms which choose a low creditor concen-
tration ex-ante do so in order to later have an ability to expropriate them ex-post.
Thus, small creditors demand a promised premium for oﬀering credit to such ﬁrms.
Bank debt requires less of a promised premium. However, in the signaling variant of
our model, banks also may earn positive rents, which is required for the high-quality
ﬁrm to separate.
The implications of our model are relatively sharp, and diﬀerent from those
in which diﬀuseness helps creditors (Bolton and Scharfstein (1996)). As already
mentioned in the introduction, we believe that small credit (such as trade credit)
and debt that is uncoordinated by a strong bond trustee are the prime applications
for the model.
28A Existing Empirical Evidence
Naturally, there are no tests for our theory, yet. Indeed, with the exception of our
pilot study above, we failed to ﬁnd evidence relating APR violations to creditor con-
centration. But we did ﬁnd evidence relating the duration of the workout period to
creditor concentration: Helwege (1999) analyzes junk bond defaults in the 1980s.
Her abstract summarizes the ﬁndings relevant to us: “bondholder holdouts are not
a signiﬁcant problem, as ﬁrms with proportionately more bonds have shorter de-
fault spells...bargaining problems arising from contingent liabilities, lawsuits, and
size delay the process, although multiple bond classes do not. Neither informa-
tion problems nor ﬁrm value appear to matter.” Of course, time holdout is not
necessarily a good measure of settlement, although it is indicative of the presence
of shareholder holdout issues. The lack of time holdout is thus not necessarily a
smoking gun, but it is hint that creditor holdout issues are perhaps not too impor-
tant.
Brunner and Krahnen (2001) ﬁnd that creditor pools increase the probability
of workout success, and that coordination costs are higher when there are more
creditors. However, they do not determine if such pools improve or worsen the
settlements obtained by creditors.
Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1997) ﬁnd that vulture investors became more promi-
nent in the 1980’s and 1990’s. These vulture investors serve many roles, and not
all of them are proactive. Still, the paper suggests that vultures can enhance not
only their own claims (both for their class and for themselves), but also the ﬁrm’s
overall value, by actively pressuring management. The very fact that active vultures
purchase large blocks in ﬁnancial distress, often from dispersed claimants, seems
to indicate at least that the claimant’s loss of bargaining power may not be drastic
and/or outweighed by the creditors’ gains from “undispersing” themselves.
There is some disagreement as to the extent of the direct costs of ﬁnancial dis-
tress. The order of magnitude of direct court-ﬁled fees are about 2-4% of the value of
assets (20% of the market value of equity), depending on whether one includes costs
29of failed workouts and exchange oﬀers, etc. Lubben (2000) reviews the evidence and
provides some new evidence. In a sample including mostly mid-size companies,
debtor’s expenses for attorneys tend to be about $680,000 (mean), $300,000 (me-
dian). Adding accountants and investment bankers roughly doubles these ﬁgures.
Creditor Committees spend about $230,000 (mean), $70,000 (median). Accountants
and investment bankers add only about 50 percent more. (If we use these ﬁgures to
calibrate our model, this implies an eﬀective creditor diﬀuseness of about N  3.)
However, in “ten [of 22] cases in the sample the United States Trustee was unable
to appoint creditors’ committee, most often because of lack of interest among un-
secured creditors” [p.530]. The article also points out cases in which businesses
misjudged the diﬃculties of complying with code requirements, and thus were de-
nied reimbursements for their claims; and lack of understanding of and frustration
with the Bankruptcy Code by businessmen.
Although we believe that ﬁnancial contracts can be and often are written in a way
to mitigate legal costs, there are instances in which priority changes unexpectedly.
In such cases, one can get an indication of the (usually) out-of-equilibrium costs of
litigation. Anderson (1987, p.442) describes the Manville asbestos experience, in
which customers unexpectedly received priority over creditors in bankruptcy
An Institute for Civil Justice–Rand Corp study estimates that for every
dollar paid to injured claimants, nearly two dollars are spent on litiga-
tion expenses. More speciﬁcally, of the total amount paid by producers
and insurers, 37 percent was received by plaintiﬀs, 26 percent by plain-
tiﬀs’ attorneys, and 37 percent was spent by producers and insurers on
defense costs.
Even though our model has situations in which (high-quality) issuers like higher
litigation costs in order to deter low-quality issuers, a calibration of our model in-
dicates that we would not expect to see such legal costs in equilibrium. Indeed,
for the most part, our model predicts relatively moderate expenses and only some
APR violations. The Manville experience is supportive of our argument only inso-
30far as it indicates that out-of-equilibrium legal costs can be quite signiﬁcant, and
that observed legal costs may be small by intent, i.e., by choice of the mechanisms
considered in our and other papers.
In sum, although there is little evidence that directly relates creditor (claimant)
concentration and coordination to the ultimate settlement (except that presented
above in our paper), there is good evidence that creditors often coalesce in ﬁnancial
distress. Although coalition-forming could be (partially) to avoid a “creditor run on
the ﬁrm” and to enhance ﬁrm value, it is also possible that this coalition-forming
serves to increase (not decrease) the relative bargaining strength of creditors.
VII Conclusion
Our paper has reexamined the question posed in the Bolton and Scharfstein (1996)
JPE paper regarding the optimal number of creditors. We have taken an alternative
approach to oﬀer an intuition and a set of implications that diﬀer from those of our
predecessor. Thus, empiricists can easily test Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) against
ourowntheory: Forone, ourmutualalternativeis notjustanunspeciﬁed strawman.
For two, creditor concentration is a relatively easily empirically accessible variable.
Our pilot study has found preliminary evidence that creditor concentration helps
rather than hurts.
Although banks are undoubtedly unique among many dimensions, the fact that
bank credit is typically very concentrated is among its more unusual features. A
variant of our model oﬀered the speciﬁc implication that even though promised
yields on bank debt may be higher or lower than comparable public debt, bank debt
may oﬀer (single) banks excess rents.
Again, even among public creditors, concentration and coordination measures
are relatively easy to obtain. We thus hope that our theory will be put to further
empirical work—and preferably by third parties which are less likely to be suspected
of trying to ﬁnd evidence in support of their own model.
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33A Proof of Proposition 1: Signaling With Debt Pricing
and Concentration.
This appendix proves that the ﬁrm prefers to use only the number of creditors for signaling, if
possible, and uses interest rate signaling only after bumping against the N  1 limit. We need to
modify eq. 14 to accommodate non-zero debt yields:
I  1  r  G

?VOld  1   ?VOld   X   cdLd

 1   GFVNY ; (36)
where the superscript NY on FV reﬂects the fact that the good ﬁrm uses both N and the debt yield
as signals. Hence
FVNY 
I1  r   G VOld   1   ?X   cdLd
1   G
: (37)
Separation will occur as long as GFI




1   ?X   ceLe

1 BVNew VOld  FVNY VOld   I  1   BVNew  0 (38)








VNew  VOld  
I1  r   G VOld   1   ?X   cdLd
1   G

 VOld   I  1   BVNew


X1   ?  I   VOld

B   G   1   BrI
 B1   GceLe  1   BGcdLd
 0 (39)
Setting this expression to zero deﬁnes the signaling equilibrium N?;r?. Solving for r? as a
function of N?:
r? 
X1   ?  I   VOldB   G  
h
B1   GceL?





r? depends on N? through ?, L?
d, and L?











34Finally, substitute FVNY into the expression for E (from equation (16?)):
ENY  G

1   ?X   ceL?
e








e   X1   ?






 1   GVNew (42)
In terms of entrepreneurial proceeds, the equilibrium  b N;r  0 dominates the equilibrium
N?;r?  0 deﬁned in eq. 39. This is because ENY increases with ?, but is indendent of r.
Thus, any equilibrium with both signals is dominated by an equilibrium of the type N;r  0, as
long the latter is feasible (i.e., does not run into the N  1 constraint).15
When N?  1: We now consider when N alone is not suﬃcient for the ﬁrms to separate (i.e.,
even with N?  1). We now show that the ﬁrm needs to additionally increase the debt yield to








that is, the value of  when N  1. In this case, the entrepreneur oﬀers debt with face value such
that:
I1  r  G
h
1VOld  1   1VOld   X   cdL1
d
i
 1   GFV?? : (44)

















I1  r??   G
h









1   1X   ceL1
e
i
1 BVNewVOld FV?? VOld   I  1   BVNew  0 (47)
15The single-crossing property also assures us that the high-quality ﬁrm prefers to adhere to the
equilibrium over pretending that it is a low-quality ﬁrm.




1   1X   ceL1
e
i
1 BVNewVOld FVr0;N1 VOld   I  1   BVNew > 0 (48)
This equation states that N  1 is insuﬃcient to separate (proﬁts from imitation are greater than
zero). That is, separation with N only is not enough, even for N  1.
It is also the case that signaling with N  1 and r?? is preferred to signaling with r alone:
From eq. 42, E1;r?? > E1;r, where E1;r is the value of equity when the ﬁrm optimally
signals with r alone.
36Table 1. Table of Symbols
Symbol Explanation Example
VOld Value of Assets in Place VOld  $80
VNew Value of New (Extra) Project in Non-Distress (Zero in distress). VNew  $250
V VNew  VOld ! V  $330
X Amount that can be lobbied for in ﬁnancial distress X  $80
I Cost of Extra Project. VOld  VNew > I > VOld I  $100
 Probability of Distress, generic   40%
G (Signaling Game:) Probability of Distress for Good Firm. G  40%
B (Signaling Game:) Probability of Distress for Bad Firm. B  50%
 Conﬂict Decisiveness Parameter in .   1:5
ce unit cost of lobbying for equity. ce  $1
cd unit cost of lobbying for debt. cd  $1
Solutions in Signaling Model for High-Quality Firm
Le Lobbying Eﬀort by Equity (Management, Entrepreneur) for X. ! L?
e  21:067
Ld Aggregate lobbying eﬀort by all creditors for X. ! L?
d  9:313
ld Lobbying eﬀort by a single creditors for X. ! l?
d  4:117
lo Lobbying eﬀort by other creditors for X. ! l?
o  5:196
 Contest Success Function, allocation of X between equity and debt, !   0:227
 Le;Ld depending on exerted lobbying eﬀort. 21:067;9:313
N Number of Creditors (Endogenous Choice Variable). ! N?  2:26
E Entrepreneurial Proﬁt ! E?N  2:26  117:85
FV Debt Face Value ! FV?N  2:26  160:76
GFI Gains from Imitation in Signaling Model ! GFI?  0
(Full Information Value: $130 ) Cost of Signaling: $12.152
Side Conditions
1   VNew  I The project is worthwhile.
X  VOld Only a part of the ﬁrm value can be lobbied for.
N 2 I There are no negative or fractional creditors.
cd  ce Management’s lobbying costs are no higher than creditors’.
0 <  <  Facilitates sensible contest success function.
where  is deﬁned by K   1 < 1.
















































Probability of Bankruptcy for Bad Firm
[Not Useful: Good Firm Worse Than Bad Firm]
Bank Debt + Rate Signaling: N=1, r>0






Figure 1 plots the regions in which signaling by creditor concentration alone signals
creditor quality and in which signaling requires not only the ultimate concentration
(N  1, i.e., bankdebt), but also an expected interest above zero. The parameter
values for this ﬁgure are as in our numerical examples: VOld  $80;VNew  $250;X 
$80;I  $100;ce  cd  $1, and   1:5. A positive interest rate is required when
g < b   3=2b      3. If 1   B  VNew < I, i.e., when B > 0:6, the new
project is not a positive NPV project.
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Figure 2 plots the promised rate of returns as a function of the optimal number of
creditors. (To obtain diﬀerent optimal number of creditors, we vary G. [Changing
B would have the same eﬀect.]) When N > 1, this is simply the yield required
to oﬀer creditors a zero expected rate of return. (For numerical convenience and
to keep in-text computations easy to repeat, we are working with numbers that
produce unrealistically high promised yields.) The expected yield is always zero,
except when N  1. Not plotted: When N  1, i.e., (house) bank debt, the expected
yield can range anywhere from 0 to 45%. (The promised yield would thus be higher.)
39Table 2. Comparison With Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) Model of Number of
Creditors
Relationship BS 1996 BW 2001
Low Concentration more APR: less APR:
( Public Debt ) Creditor-Friendly Settlement Creditor-Unfriendly Settlement
Firm Unfriendly Settlement Firm Friendly Settlement
High Concentration less APR: more APR:
( Bank Debt ) Creditor-Unfriendly Settlement Creditor-Friendly Settlement
Firm Friendly Settlement Firm Unfriendly Settlement
Concentration vs. Corporate Termination Less Frequent Undef
Concentration Vs. Promised Interest Rate High or Undef Low
Bank Debt Vs. Expected Interest Rate Zero Zero (or Positive)
Concentration Vs. Holdout (Time) Negative Undef
Concentration Vs. Creditor Lobbying Ex-
penses
Undef Higher
Concentration Vs. Lobbying Expenses of
Firm
Undef Higher
Concentration Vs. Total Lobbying Expenses Undef higher
Concentration Vs. Ineﬃcient Outcome Ambiguous
Higher
(except with add-on)
Concentration Incentives for Creditors Ex-
Post
Negative or Ambiguous Positive
Lawyer Expenses Uncover Value Seek Rents
Note: Public Debt is assumed equivalent to highly dispersed debt. Bank Debt is assumed
equivalent to highly concentrated debt.
40